New Insights into William James’s Personal Crisis in the Early  1870s: Part 1. Arthur Schopenhauer and the Origin & Nature of the Crisis by Leary, David E.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology
2015
New Insights into William James’s Personal Crisis
in the Early 1870s: Part 1. Arthur Schopenhauer
and the Origin & Nature of the Crisis
David E. Leary
University of Richmond, dleary@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty-
publications
Part of the Theory and Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leary, David E. "New Insights into William James’s Personal Crisis in the Early 1870s: Part 1. Arthur Schopenhauer and the Origin &
Nature of the Crisis." William James Studies 11 (2015): 1-27.
	  William James Studies 
2015, Vol. 11, pp. 1-27 
	  
NEW INSIGHTS INTO WILLIAM JAMES’S PERSONAL CRISIS 
IN THE EARLY 1870s: PART I. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER 
AND THE ORIGIN & NATURE OF THE CRISIS 
  
DAVID E. LEARY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article, the first in a two-part sequence, will cast new light on the well-
known “crisis of William James” by presenting evidence regarding the 
previously unrecognized role of Arthur Schopenhauer’s thought in shaping and 
intensifying the way in which James experienced this crisis.  It will also relate 
Schopenhauer’s influence to prior issues that had concerned James, and in an 
appendix it will provide an overview of other areas in which Schopenhauer 
seems to have influenced James, both during and after his personal crisis.  The 
second article in this sequence will present evidence in support of the strong 
possibility that John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress played a previously 
unrecognized role in inspiring James’s means of defense against the frightening 
hallucination and panic fear that characterized his crisis.  It will also present an 
argument regarding the probable influence of his defensive measures upon his 
subsequent views on the nature and importance of attention and will in human 
life.  Along the way, it will identify James’s specific, newly discovered copy of 
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress and the specific, newly discovered Bible 
through which he developed familiarity with the scriptural phrases that helped 
him get through his ordeal.   
 
THE STATUS QUO AND RECENT DISCOVERIES 
 
Paul J. Croce (2009) has provided a very thorough review of the extensive 
literature on “the crisis of William James” as portrayed in James’s classic 
passage on “the worst kind of melancholy” in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902/1985).1  Croce’s carefully articulated contention is that this 
passage presents a “mannered memory” offered by James as a “teachable 
moment” within the unfolding argument of his chapter on “The Sick Soul.”  
This is an entirely reasonable conclusion, especially given James’s own 
comments on stylized memory-reports: 
 
The accounts we give to others of our experiences…we almost 
always make both more simple and more interesting than the 
truth.  We quote what we should have said or done, rather than 
what we really said or did; and in the first telling we may be 
fully aware of the distinction.  But ere long the fiction expels 
the reality from memory and reigns in its stead alone.  This is 
one great source of the fallibility of testimony meant to be 
quite honest.  Especially where the marvellous is concerned, 
the story takes a tilt that way, and the memory follows the 
story. (James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 353) 
 
Over the past two decades, scientific research on false testimony has confirmed 
James’s remarkable insight regarding the “narrative demands” placed upon 
producers of verbal reports.  As Jerome Bruner (2002) has illustrated with 
examples drawn from law, literature, and life, a considerable amount of 
“smoothing” and “filling” takes place as actual events, with all their edges and 
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gaps, are converted into more continuous and coherent accounts.  This is now a 
well-established phenomenon (see, e.g., Loftus et al., 2013, and Schacter, 1995). 
Even so, there is good reason – and compelling evidence – to think, as 
Croce does, that James’s report is generally truthful if not, in fact, the Holy Grail 
of Truth Entire.2 And that could be the end of it, except that there is more to say 
about James’s crisis and its resolution, prompted in part by the recent discovery 
of books that were in James’s hands just before, and manifestly on his mind 
during, his hallucinatory encounter with the greenish-skinned, idiotic youth 
whose image prompted James’s panic fear that “That shape am I...if the hour for 
it should strike for me as it struck for him” (James, 1902/1985, p. 134).  
Although absolute proof is too much to expect, I believe that a very 
compelling story can be told (in this article) about how Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
works shaped and intensified the way that James experienced his frightful vision 
and, furthermore, that the story can be extended (as it will be in Part II of this 
two-part sequence) to show how a work of John Bunyan’s – and more 
particularly, James’s recently discovered personal copy of The Pilgrim’s 
Progress (1678-1684/1869) – could have provided a model that James followed 
in his time of “quivering fear” and “horrible dread” (James, 1902/1985, p. 134).  
In telling the first part of this story I will connect the issues raised by 
Schopenhauer’s works to a larger set of issues that had concerned James for 
more than a decade, and (in the next installment) I will show how Bunyan’s 
model of defense against the adversary – or more precisely, the model provided 
by Christian, Bunyan’s pilgrim – very possibly helped James get through his 
moment of crisis and thus served as the kernel that he nurtured into his later 
accounts of attention and will, which were so central to his Principles of 
Psychology (1890/1981) and so important to his mature philosophical views.  I 
will also identify the specific, newly discovered Bible (The Holy Bible, 1856) 
that prepared James to follow Christian’s example.  
 
DISCOVERIES REGARDING JAMES’S READING OF SCHOPENHAUER 
 
That James read here and there in Arthur Schopenhauer’s works has 
always been known.  Though he didn’t write much about this reading, James 
referred to Schopenhauer from time to time in his letters, lectures, manuscripts, 
and published works.  Yet, probably because these references were typically 
brief, rarely involved sustained analysis, and almost always conveyed a reaction 
against Schopenhauer – or more precisely, against an idea, approach, or tone for 
which James used Schopenhauer as a mere representative – and also because 
James, in later years, expressed disdain for Schopenhauer and his philosophy, no 
one has ever made much of James’s relation to Schopenhauer or his thought.  In 
fact, even Ralph Barton Perry, who went further than anyone else (so far as I 
know), devoted only four out of 1,612 pages in his classic Thought and 
Character of William James (1935) to James and Schopenhauer, mostly to quote 
a long letter from 1883 that clarified what the more mature James didn’t like 
about Schopenhauer and his thought (Vol. 1, pp. 721-724).3   
Perry did note in passing, however, that James “credited Schopenhauer 
with being the first among philosophers to speak ‘the concrete truth about the 
ills of life’” (p. 721).  That comment bears directly upon the important attraction 
that Schopenhauer exercised over James, which in turn signals the critical debate 
that James was waging within himself, throughout the 1860s and early 1870s, 
regarding the nature of the world, its evils, and the possibility that those evils 
could be ameliorated through willful efforts on his part and that of others.  As 
this article will show, Schopenhauer played a previously unrecognized role in 
this inner debate, up to and beyond James’s personal crisis.   
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Before surveying some information that has recently come to light, a 
review of facts mentioned by Perry (1935) will help to situate the significance of 
this new information.  First, in 1858, a 16-year-old James brandished a copy of 
“a volume of Schopenhauer” and read “amusing specimens of his delightful 
pessimism” to his Newport, R.I. friends.  Ten years later, in 1868, James bought 
his own copy of Schopenhauer’s major work, Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (3d ed., 1859).  Subsequently, in the early 1870s, he made notebook 
entries on empiricism and idealism, echoed later in The Principles of Psychology 
(1890/1981), that suggest he had been reading Schopenhauer’s Über die 
vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (3d ed., 1864).  And in 
1873 and 1875 respectively, he wrote another notebook entry and a book review 
that dismissed the kind of “pessimism” for which Schopenhauer was widely 
known.  Finally, in 1877, he was reading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung as 
he worked on “The Sentiment of Rationality,” a seminal publication that 
included several references to Schopenhauer when it appeared in 1879 (James, 
1879/1978c).  The only then-known fact not mentioned by Perry, at least as 
regards the period that concerns us, is that James cited Schopenhauer in his diary 
as one of the authors he read in 1869 and 1870.4   
So it isn’t that nothing has been known about James’s various contacts 
with Schopenhauer during his formative years; it’s just that little has been made 
of those contacts, perhaps because (in addition to the reasons given above) 
James was reading so many authors on so many topics during those years 
(especially since late 1868, when he purchased Schopenhauer’s magnum opus), 
despite his continuing physical and psychological problems.   
What has prompted another look at James’s relation to Schopenhauer are 
some facts I discovered while going through the library charging ledgers for 
both the Harvard College Library and the Boston Athenaeum:  James checked 
out Schopenhauer’s Parerga und Paralipomena (1851) and Wilhelm Gwinner’s 
Schopenhauer aus persönlichem Umgange dargestelt (1862) from the Harvard 
College Library on January 31, 1867; he took out Gwinner’s book again from 
the same library on December 1, 1869; he withdrew Schopenhauer’s book again, 
though this time from the Boston Athenaeum, on December 22, 1869; he 
checked out Schopenhauer’s Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (1841) from 
the Harvard College Library on January 13, 1870; and finally he took out 
another book by Schopenhauer, probably Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes 
vom zureichenden Grunde (3d ed., 1864), but possibly Parerga und 
Paralipomena or Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (the ledger simply 
indicates Schopenhauer, not the individual volume) from the Harvard College 
Library on March 7, 1870.  Meanwhile he was also reading his own personal 
copy of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.5   
Clearly, more was going on between James and Schopenhauer than has 
been realized by scholars in the past, though there are mitigating circumstances 
for this oversight: not only the obscure and unfrequented location of the library 
charging records, but more significantly the silence of James himself regarding 
his reading of Schopenhauer during this period – a silence that is all the more 
intriguing since he was typically open and even eager to discuss what he was 
reading, both in his own letters and in conversations with others, which 
sometimes led to second-hand reports in their letters.  And besides the silence in 
his letters and those of others, there is silence in James’s diary, notebooks, and 
other documents.  True, some pages and other materials from this period have 
been destroyed, but those that remain contain nothing about James’s now 
apparent extensive reading of Schopenhauer.   
It seems reasonable to conjecture that James kept his reading of 
Schopenhauer to himself because he didn’t want to explain or defend this 
reading to members of his family or to friends who were concerned about his 
emotional and intellectual state of mind.  (Schopenhauer would not have been 
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on anyone’s list of recommended reading for a depressed, sometimes suicidal 
young man.  As noted in the second installment of this two-part sequence, James 
tried to shield his mother, in particular, from awareness of his disturbed state of 
mind – unsuccessfully of course.)  But whatever the reason for James’s silence, 
we shall see clear evidence of the impact of his encounter with Schopenhauer 
when we revisit the report of his personal crisis that he published in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985).  That evidence is there for all to 
see, once the doors of perception are opened.  As James himself wrote several 
decades later, “the only things which we commonly see are those which we 
preperceive, and the only things which we preperceive are those which have 
been labeled for us” (James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 420, italics deleted).  
Although the signs of Schopenhauer’s thought are clearly embedded in James’s 
report, no one has yet labeled their provenance or identified their significance.  
Before saying more about this, however, I need to say a few words about 
James’s personal crisis.    
 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF JAMES’S PERSONAL CRISIS 
 
No one is certain about the exact time that James suffered the frightful 
apparition and fear reported in The Varieties of Religious Experience, though the 
strong consensus, as Croce (2009) has indicated, is sometime in 1870 or 
thereabouts, most probably in the winter of 1870, but possibly a bit later.  In 
fact, it could well have been associated with that “great dorsal collapse” that 
James dated “around the 10th or 12[th]” of January, 1870, especially since this 
physical collapse was accompanied, he said, by “a moral one” that left him 
questioning what he called “the moral business” (James, 1868-1873, entry for 
February 1, 1870).6  For although a full accounting of James’s personal crisis 
would involve extended discussions of his ongoing poor health, frequent 
depression, occasional suicidal impulses, prolonged career indecision, the 
declining health and then death of his beloved cousin Minny Temple, and other 
issues, the core of his crisis  – as reported explicitly in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience – was a very specific fear: not a fear of continuing depression, or 
indecisiveness about his career, or the potential or actual loss of a loved one, or 
anything else other than the fear that if fate so determined – if the impersonal 
laws of physical and physiological causation just happened to work out that way 
– he would go insane just as pitifully and unavoidably as the idiotic youth of his 
frightful vision.7   
What grabbed James by the throat and shook him to his innermost being 
was thus a consequence of a more fundamental fear that “we are nature through 
and through” and, hence, if his time to go insane were to come, there would be 
absolutely nothing he could do about it.  So, while insanity was the immediate 
object of his fear during his moment of crisis, it was the more general possibility 
of being at the complete, passive mercy of causal forces that lent such shattering 
force to his experience, making him panic like a non-swimmer in a sinking life 
raft in the middle of an ocean.  His raft until then had been buoyed, if barely, by 
a desperate patchwork of hopes regarding “the moral business” mentioned 
above, held together by a cluster of ideas related to a deep longing to believe in 
free will and a passionate desire to make a difference in the world, both through 
opposing the evils he perceived and through his collaborative fellowship with 
others.8   
James had struggled with these hopes and associated fears as well as with 
his too-tentative belief in free will for a good many years, but a death spiral of 
concerns and apprehensions seems to have come to a head in January, 1870.  
Even after February 1, when he guessed that he had “about touched bottom,” he 
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continued to struggle until, understandably, he seems to have hit a new bottom 
when he learned, a day after the fact, that Minny Temple had died on March 8.  
In any case, James’s response to his cousin’s death, exacerbated by the intimate 
communications the two had shared in the months before her death, led to the 
often cited turning-point of April 29, 1870, when James was moved by his 
reading of Charles Renouvier’s second Essai de critique générale (1859) to 
choose to believe in free will:  As he famously wrote in his diary, “My first act 
of free will shall be to believe in free will” (James, 1868-1873).  Although this 
significant moment plays a pivotal role in all of his biographies, it is clear that 
James wasn’t able to follow his intentions as consistently as he had hoped; his 
willful conviction about free will wavered over the next few years.  Even though 
he moved forward (and upward) in general, the road he trod was rough and 
uneven.9 So, whether or not the incident reported in Varieties took place at some 
point between mid-January and late April, 1870, as seems highly probable (and 
all the more so in light of what follows in this article), James continued to 
struggle, most commentators agree, until he reached higher ground and stayed 
there for the most part, following his marriage to Alice Howe Gibbens on July 
10, 1878. By that time he had established himself at Harvard, delivered 
important lecture series in Baltimore and Boston, and begun writing the first 
articles that would lead, over a long twelve years, to the publication of his 
Principles of Psychology (1890/1981).  
 Now it is time to tell the story that emerges from my recent discoveries 
about the extent and timing of James’s reading of Schopenhauer. 
 
JAMES’S CRISIS IN LIGHT OF HIS READING OF SCHOPENHAUER 
 
 Here are some selected portions of the classic account that James gave of 
his personal crisis in The Varieties of Religious Experience: 
 
Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general 
depression of spirits about my prospects...suddenly there fell 
upon me...a horrible fear of my own existence.  
Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an 
epileptic patient...with greenish skin, entirely idiotic....This 
image and my fear entered into a species of combination with 
each other.  That shape am I, I felt, potentially.  Nothing that 
I possess can defend me against that fate, if the hour for it 
should strike for me as it struck for him.  There was such a 
horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that…I became a mass of 
quivering fear.  After this the universe was changed for me 
altogether.  I awoke morning after morning with a horrible 
dread at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the 
insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that I have 
never felt since.  It was like a revelation; and...the experience 
has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others 
ever since. (James, 1902/1985, pp. 134-135, none of the bold 
print and only the italics for “That shape am I” are in the 
original) 
 
The instantly striking thing in this account is that James identifies his preceding 
state not simply as one of “pessimism” but as one of “philosophic pessimism,” 
which is in itself a clear reference to Schopenhauer, whose thought was 
commonly discussed under this banner.  Then comes the jarring “horrible fear of 
my own existence.”  Why fear one’s own existence?  Did James fear what it 
means to be human – his being subject to the human condition?  Or did his fear 
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perhaps involve a concern for his own existence, at least as he would like to 
conceive it?  The key to interpreting this vaguely articulated fear revolves 
around the central thought in James’s entire report:  “That shape am I, I felt, 
potentially.”  James’s fear was that he could be the same as him – that his 
“discrepancy” from the idiotic, epileptic patient was “merely momentary,” a 
contingent matter of “fate.”  And this devastating thought changed not just his 
perception of himself but his perception of the entire universe.  It was “like a 
revelation,” like the kind of life-changing realizations that Tolstoy, Bunyan, and 
others had, as James had been discussing just prior to his self-report in Varieties.  
And among the fruits of his horrific experience, James said, was a newfound 
“sympathy” – literally, a feeling at one – with others. 
The central key or fulcrum in James’s report, as already noted, was his fear 
that “That shape am I...potentially,” and this statement – even more than his 
general reference to “philosophic pessimism” – brings us to Schopenhauer’s 
very specific influence upon the form and intensity of James’s frightful 
experience.  For the critical thrust of Schopenhauer’s thought – the contention 
around which his works revolve – is that the principium individuationis (the 
principle of individuation) is false and that individuality is, therefore, an illusion.  
Or, stated in the terminology Schopenhauer borrowed from ancient Indian 
thought, the experience of individuality and the associated belief in the 
indeterminacy of individual will are chimeras resulting from seeing one’s self 
and the world through “the veil of Maya,” which is to say, from seeing them as 
they are represented in the dream-like phenomenal world of mere appearances.  
True enlightenment – and true freedom – come from ripping that veil asunder 
and ridding ourselves of the illusions (or more precisely, the delusions) resulting 
from unexamined human experience.  We must get beyond self-encapsulated 
“egotism” by realizing the wisdom in the Mahavakya (the Grand Word or 
Pronouncement) of the Chandogya Upanishad, “Tat twam asi.”  Schopenhauer 
never tired of repeating this Sanskrit phrase along with its German translation as 
“Dies bis du” which equates to the English “This art thou.”  In this simple 
formulation of the fundamental doctrine of Hinduism, shared by some forms of 
Buddhism and adopted by Schopenhauer as a succinct and accurate expression 
of the conclusion – and moral foundation – of his own systematic thought, 
“This” stands for Ultimate Reality, Brahman, or, in Schopenhauer’s 
conceptualization, Will, and “thou” stands for each and every living creature in 
the universe.  Thus, each and every living creature is understood to be a 
representation of the very same underlying nature, and their mutual 
identification with that singular nature renders each identical to every other.  
Any sense of individuality is simply a trick of phenomenal experience – an 
“illusion” – on this side of “the veil of Maya.”10   
Here is the crucial point:  This defining statement – “Tat twam asi” or 
“This art thou” – captures precisely what James suddenly felt and expressed in 
only slightly different words:  “That shape am I,” at least potentially.  And all 
the “dread” and “insecurity” that he felt during his revelatory experience was 
apparently – from his own description – the result of his being overwhelmed by 
the thought that this could be true, that only contingent considerations had 
created and preserved his phenomenal sense of “discrepancy” from others: a 
sense that was crucial for “the moral business” (involving free will, individual 
effort, and personal contributions) that meant so much to him.   
Thus, as indicated, the internal evidence within James’s report, by itself, 
provides prima facie reason to accept a Schopenhauerian interpretation of 
James’s personal crisis, but additional weight as well as suggestive evidence 
regarding the dating of James’s personal crisis can be gained through an 
examination of some of his diary entries between 1870 and 1873 (in James, 
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1868-1873).  As already mentioned, James’s entry for February 1, 1870 – the 
one in which he noted that he had “about touched bottom” – raised the issue of 
“the moral business.”  He had come to perceive, he wrote, “that I must face the 
choice with open eyes: shall I frankly throw the moral business overboard, as 
one unsuited to my innate aptitude, or shall I follow it, and it alone, making 
everything else merely stuff for it? – I will give the latter alternative a fair trial.  
Who knows but the moral interest may become developed.”  Clearly, he was 
having trouble convincing himself that he could be successful in cultivating 
what he called his “moral interest,” which ultimately concerned (he said) getting 
“my moral life to become active,” so that – as he had previously put it – “I might 
make my nick, however small a one in the raw stuff the race has got to shape” 
(James, 1868/1995b, p. 250).  But as relevant as this entry may be for 
understanding James’s general frame of mind, it also reveals that what he was 
questioning was his individual ability to follow through on something that he 
chose to do; in short, he was not (yet) questioning his individuality or even, at 
the moment, the potential efficacy of his will. 
But in his next diary entry on March 22, 1870, written two weeks after 
Minny Temple’s death, a very significant shift has taken place.  In this heart-
wrenching entry, addressed to Minny, James wrote:  
 
By that big part of me that’s in the tomb with you, may I 
realize and believe in the immediacy of death!  May I feel that 
every torment suffered here passes and is as a breath of wind – 
every pleasure too.  Acts & examples stay.  Time is long.  One 
human life is an instant….Minny, your death makes me feel 
the nothingness of all our egotistic fury.  The inevitable 
release is sure; wherefore take our turn kindly whatever it 
contain.  Ascend to some sort of partnership with fate, & since 
tragedy is at the heart of us, go to meet it, work it to our ends, 
instead of dodging it all our days, and being run down by it at 
last.  Use your death (or your life, it’s all one meaning) tat 
twam asi. (James, 1868-1873) 
 
Note that James started this entry by expressing his identification with Minny.11  
A big part of him is in the tomb with her.  Their individuality – their seeming 
difference – even his being alive and her being dead – is no longer relevant.  
They are one, and all petty egotism, at least for the moment, has come to 
nothing.  We need to submit to fate, he says, recognizing the tragedy of human 
life and accepting that death and life are ultimately the same.  All of this – the 
very wording as well as the sentiments expressed – smacks loudly of 
Schopenhauer, but the ultimate corroboration of the Schopenhauerian 
connection is the “tat twam asi” that concludes this diary entry.  It provides a 
clear and evident link between Schopenhauer’s thought, this diary entry, and 
James’s later account of his personal crisis in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience.12   
A little over a month later, on April 30, in the diary entry that reports 
James’s decision to follow Renouvier’s lead and believe in free will (an entry 
that thus underscores that he had been doubting the existence of free will in a 
way that he hadn’t admitted on February 1), James makes the telling comment 
that he sees no reason why the belief in free will, which after all was a belief in 
the efficacy of his own individuality, “need be the definition of an illusion.”  In 
fact, he wrote, “I will assume for the present – until next year – that it is no 
illusion.”  These hedged assertions (that belief in one’s ability to act on one’s 
own initiative need not be an illusion, and that one can at least provisionally 
assume that it is not) seem clearly to allude to Schopenhauer’s argument that 
belief in individuality and in the indeterminacy of human will is not just wrong, 
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but is an “illusion” created by the veil (or dream) of Maya.  In addition, James’s 
vow in this entry to “abstain from the mere speculation & contemplative 
Grübelei [musings] in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily [to] 
cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well 
as by acting” (italics added), is entirely consistent with the contention that James 
was now reacting against the kinds of reflection and reading that seem to have 
precipitated his moment of crisis.  This suggests that James’s personal crisis, 
with its apparent Schopenhauer-inspired fears, had already taken place, and 
that James was now attempting to move beyond it by implementing a twofold 
strategy of (1) believing and acting as if he were in control of his life and (2) 
avoiding the kinds of ideas and written materials that could cast doubt upon this 
working premise.13   
Eventually, James noted in the same entry, he might “return to metaphysic 
study & skepticism without danger to my powers of action,” but for now, he 
pledged to avoid such study and skepticism – and by implication, to avoid 
Schopenhauer.  Then, expanding upon his earlier statement, James proclaimed 
that he would go “a step further” than simply believing in his own individual 
will; he would “believe in my individual reality and creative power,” precisely 
the things that Schopenhauer would have prompted him to doubt.  (In fact, it is 
only in the context of Schopenhauer’s thought that it makes sense for James to 
add this affirmation of “individual reality and creative power” to his already 
stated affirmation of the efficacy of his will.)  Yet even here James offered a 
qualification:  “My belief to be sure can’t be optimistic – but I will posit life, 
(the real, the good) in the self governing resistance of the ego to the world.”  
With this final proposition, James had completed his turn-around:  Instead of 
envisioning the universe pressing down and threatening to absorb him against 
his will and against any other power at his disposal, as he had, so frighteningly, 
during his personal crisis, he now took his stand by asserting the reality of his 
ego and positing that its “self governance” consisted in the ability to push back 
and resist the way of the world.  However tentatively, he was back into “the 
moral business.”   
It is possible that James went on in his diary to comment more explicitly 
about his rejection of Schopenhauer’s thought, but this is precisely the point at 
which he (or someone else) ripped some pages out of his diary, including the 
lower half of the page from which I have been quoting.  That truncated entry 
now ends with a line that has been made out to read “Life shall be built doing & 
suffering & creating….”  
Three years passed before James made another extant diary entry.  It is a 
short entry, written on February 10, 1873, that reported his decision “to stick to 
biology as a profession” even though he would continue to regard philosophy as 
his “vocation.”  Just over a month later, on March 18, James’s father wrote to 
his brother Henry that “Willy” was (finally!) going along “swimmingly” and 
that he, William, had reported that “my mind [is] so cleared up and restored to 
sanity.  It is the difference between death and life.”  Death and life were no 
longer the same!  One reason for his recovery, William said, was the positive 
reading he was doing (the kind of reading he had vowed to do back on April 30, 
1870), especially works by Renouvier and Wordsworth.  But the primary reason 
that William gave, his father wrote, was “his having given up the notion that all 
mental disorder required to have a physical basis,” which was a point that 
Schopenhauer (along with others) had argued and that James had specifically 
feared during his moment of crisis (letter quoted in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 339-
340).14 
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That James hadn’t entirely escaped Schopenhauer, despite his apparent 
improvement, was manifest on April 10, 1873, in the second diary entry that he 
wrote after that three-year gap:  
 
Philosophical activity as a business is not normal for most 
men, and not for me….I fear the constant sense of instability 
generated by this attitude [i.e., the critical and skeptical 
attitude appropriate to philosophical inquiry] wd. be more than 
the voluntary faith I can keep going is sufficient to neutralize – 
and that the dream-conception, ‘Maya,’ the abyss of horrors, 
would ’spite of everything grasp my imagination and imperil 
my reason.  
 
This passage harkens back to James’s encounter with Schopenhauer and the 
concept of “Maya,” which apparently still posed a threat to his imagination and 
sanity.  For a budding naturalist and empiricist, the specter that phenomenal 
experience, including the experience of individual differences, might be illusory 
was understandably disturbing.  Clearly, James had not yet fully exorcised the 
earlier impact of Schopenhauer. 
Two years later, in October 1875, James again looked back on his personal 
crisis, this time in a more distanced and objective way.  He did so in a review of 
“German Pessimism,” which provides virtually conclusive support for the 
argument I have been making about the significance of Schopenhauer’s thought 
in shaping and intensifying his crisis.  In this review, after admitting that 
Schopenhauer was “assuredly one of the greatest of writers,” James 
cautioned that “when he [Schopenhauer] morbidly reiterates the mystic 
Sanskrit motto, Tat twam asi – This [maniac or cripple] art thou – as the 
truth of truths, he will of course exert a spell over persons in the 
unwholesome sentimental moulting-time of youth” (James 1875/1987b, p. 
312, bold print added).  Take special note that the bracketed “maniac or cripple” 
was inserted into the middle of James’s translation of Tat twam asi (“This art 
thou”) by James himself; it is not a later or editorial emendation.  Read this 
quotation again!  I don’t know how much closer we could ever hope to come 
(short of an out-and-out admission by James) to proving that in his own 
“unwholesome sentimental moulting-time” he had fallen under Schopenhauer’s 
spell, thus allowing his memory of an idiotic (“maniacal”) and epileptic 
(“crippled”) patient to enter into “a species of combination,” as he put it in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, with the fears prompted by Schopenhauer’s 
denial of the reality of individual differences, thus leading to the horrific thought 
– “That shape am I…potentially” – that stood at the center of the experience we 
have come to know as “the personal crisis of William James.” 
Although I believe that I have now provided more than sufficient evidence 
to support the central thesis of this article, there is yet another piece of evidence 
that I would like to share.  It comes from James’s posthumously published Some 
Problems of Philosophy (1911/1979c).  In this work, the first substantive 
problem that James addressed, after making some preliminary comments on 
metaphysics in general, was “The Problem of Being.”  Not by chance, we might 
now assume, James began his discussion with a long quotation from 
Schopenhauer, noting that “Schopenhauer’s remarks on this question may be 
considered classical” (p. 26).  And after providing the quotation, which he took 
from Schopenhauer’s chapter “On the Metaphysical Need of Man” (this is 
James’s translation of the chapter’s German title, “Ueber das metaphysiche 
Bedürfniss des Menchen”), James went on to write that “one need only shut 
oneself in a closet and begin to think of the fact of one’s being there, of one’s 
queer bodily shape in the darkness (a thing to make children scream at, as 
Stevenson says), of one’s fantastic character and all, to have wonder steal over 
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the detail as much as [over] the general fact of being” (pp. 26-27).  A sense of 
wonder at one’s “queer bodily shape”?  while “in a closet”?  and “in the 
darkness”?  I assume you have already noted the similarity between “one’s 
queer bodily shape” and “That [terrible] shape am I,” but what about one’s 
being “in a closet” and “in the darkness”?  In quoting from James’s account of 
his personal crisis in Varieties, earlier in this article, I omitted a clause – not 
needed at the time – that is relevant in the context of this later statement.  
According to his full account, James’s personal crisis occurred, not only while 
he was in a “state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits 
about my prospects,” but also when he “went one evening into a dressing-room 
in the twilight to procure some article that was there” (James, 1902/1985, p. 
134).  The parallel between being “in the darkness” and going into an enclosed 
room at “twilight” is obvious, and the interchangeable use of the words 
“dressing-room” and “closet” in those days is widely known.  (In fact, the term 
for dressing-room in French, the supposed original language of James’s report, 
is cabinet [closet] de toilette.)  Although James reported “wonder” rather than 
“panic fear” as the typical metaphysical state of mind, the general parallel 
between the occasion of his personal crisis and his prescription for getting in 
touch with the problem of being seems more than coincidental.  Indeed, it is 
relevant to add that Schopenhauer’s comments on the problem of being include 
the observation that metaphysical “wonder” passes into “unrest” at “the thought 
[that] the non-existence of the world [and hence of one’s own individual being] 
is just as possible as its existence,” and that “wonder” then passes beyond 
“unrest” into “brooding” over the possible “fatality” that could produce a world 
that is “hostile to our own interests.”  Philosophy thus begins, Schopenhauer 
says, in “a minor chord” (as translated and quoted by James, 1911/1979c, p. 26).  
Doesn’t this seem more than a mere echo of James’s own journey through a 
moment of crisis to a life of philosophical reflection? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I said earlier that the dating of James’s personal crisis cannot be 
determined with absolute certainty, but the sequence of events I have surveyed 
in this article suggests very strongly that his crisis took place between Minny 
Temple’s death on March 8, 1870, and James’s declaration of free will on April 
30 of that same year.15 But whenever it happened, I think I have shown beyond 
any reasonable doubt that it assumed its unique form and intensity due to 
James’s reading of Schopenhauer. 
One might nonetheless ask if the account given in this article isn’t perhaps 
“more simple and more interesting than the truth,” as later accounts tend to be 
according to James (1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 353).  In response, all I can do is 
admit that James’s lived experience was inevitably more complicated than any 
of us – even James himself – could describe.  One doesn’t need to be a Freudian 
to believe that history and individual lives as well as cognitive and emotional 
processes are all overdetermined.  One thing that has been omitted from this 
account, for instance, is James’s contemporaneous delving into his father’s 
views on evil and selfhood.  Another is James’s earlier reading of the Stoics, 
especially Marcus Aurelius. Though formulated within very different 
intellectual frameworks, Henry James, Sr.’s arguments and Marcus Aurelius’s 
aphorisms were in their own ways as challenging as Schopenhauer’s – and not 
so different in their implications as one might think.  And it is important to note 
that James’s fear of “fate” took its initial shape from his concern about scientific 
determinism, which was on his mind before – and after – Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical determinism and ontological reductionism seem so obviously to 
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have had their sway.16 But even though nothing complicated ever happens along 
simple direct lines alone, that doesn’t mean that there aren’t some relatively 
simple, direct lines within the tangle of aspects from which historical and 
personal events can be viewed.  This article has laid out an argument and 
evidence regarding one such line that has not previously been noted.  To the 
extent that it has been successful, it should have enriched our understanding of 
the origin and nature of James’s personal crisis.17 
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APPENDIX ON SCHOPENHAUER AND JAMES  
 
Every student of philosophy is familiar with Schopenhauer’s name, and 
many know that Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche.  Far fewer realize that 
Schopenhauer also touched the lives and thought of Wagner, von Hartmann, 
Turgenev, Renan, Tolstoy, Mahler, Wundt, Durkheim, Hardy, Freud, Vaihinger, 
Conrad, Proust, Zola, Bergson, Maupassant, Strauss, Mann, Einstein, Jung, 
Lawrence, Thomas, Beckett, and Borges in significant ways, or that both 
Wittgenstein and Popper acknowledged being drawn to philosophy by their 
early contact with Schopenhauer’s work.  And even the rare student who has a 
sense of Schopenhauer’s significance in the history of Western thought is 
unlikely to have read more than a snippet of his work, if that.  For generations, 
Schopenhauer seemed formidable, forbidding…and unnecessary to read. 
This is changing, slowly but surely, as more attention is directed to 
Schopenhauer, largely (in the English speaking world) because of the scholarly 
efforts of Patrick Gardiner (1963), Bryan Magee (1997b), David Cartwright 
(2010), and others.  A recent work by Frederick C. Beiser (2014) should add 
significantly to this change.  (Much that he says is relevant to understanding 
Schopenhauer’s impact on James.)  Yet even as this occurs, it will surprise many 
to learn that James’s older and more conservative colleague, Francis Bowen, 
taught a popular course on Schopenhauer (among other figures) for years and 
years at Harvard; that Josiah Royce, James’s close intellectual colleague, was 
steeped in Schopenhauer’s thought and credited it with launching and guiding 
important aspects of his own notable work in psychology as well as philosophy; 
that Charles Renouvier, that great patron of free will, took Schopenhauer very 
seriously, if also critically; and that Max Horkheimer argued that Schopenhauer 
was ahead of his time: that in the broken world of post-World War II, 
Schopenhauer’s vision no longer seems so negative or pessimistic, but rather 
honest, bracing…and necessary. 
In this context it won’t seem so surprising that James may have taken more 
than we have realized from this post-Kantian titan, who did philosophy and the 
world the favor of following his fundamental insight, unblinkingly, as far as it 
would lead.  He may well have been wrong about many things – let’s simply 
assert that he was – but he did precisely what James himself argued a 
philosopher should do,  perhaps with Schopenhauer in mind:  He offered an 
alternative perspective on the world for us to consider (James, 1867/1978a).  
(James may have come to his perspectivism, at least in this regard, through 
considering Schopenhauer’s claim that “philosophy can never do more than 
interpret and explain what is present and at hand….It does this, however, in 
every possible relation and connexion and from every point of view” 
[Schopenhauer, 1859/1966, Vol. 1, p. 271].)  As Magee (1997a) has written, 
there is real value in a philosopher offering a vision that is “illuminating” even if 
it does not represent “literal truth.”  Advancing the same point that James was 
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making, though without any apparent awareness of that fact, Magee has argued 
for the importance of philosophers who “throw light” on issues from a 
“distinctive angle,” thus enriching “our view of the way things are” (p. 401).  
This is tantamount to saying that Schopenhauer did what the best artists do, 
which is doubly apt since he is acknowledged to be one of the finest 
philosophers of the arts.  (On the importance of “perspective” in “the art of 
human understanding” according to James, see Leary, 1992.) 
So, if James was in fact influenced by Schopenhauer more than we have 
realized (and it wouldn’t take much to reach this criterion), let’s not assume that 
this is somehow unusual or even shocking.  Anyone who chooses to investigate 
the connection between James and Schopenhauer should keep an open mind 
about the possible outcome, as Schopenhauer himself – yes, and James too – 
would have done if they were in our place. 
This is not the time for an extensive, much less exhaustive treatment of the 
relationship between Schopenhauer and James.  (In any case, I am not capable 
of providing one at this point in time.)  But a few words about James’s relation 
to Schopenhauer in the years after 1875 and a few hints about possible areas of 
influence seem in order.  Hopefully, they will provide some initial guidance for 
scholars who may wish to look more closely into the connection between 
Schopenhauer and James.  Whatever “loathing” James may have felt for 
Schopenhauer’s tone and attitude (see Note #3), he seems to have been inspired 
by Schopenhauer’s honesty about the evils of the world, by his criticism of the 
stagnant habits of the philosophical community, by his clear and sprightly 
writing (including his frequent and effective use of clinching metaphors), and by 
his careful and unfettered analysis of previous human thought, including Kant’s 
first Critique, which formed the root of Schopenhauer’s own work.  Getting 
other thinkers right was always a concern – a matter of justice as well as utility – 
for both Schopenhauer and James. 
The first tangible example of Schopenhauer’s influence on James became 
apparent in 1877 as he worked on publications that appeared in 1878 and 1879.  
I mentioned in the text that James took out Wilhelm Gwinner’s Schopenhauer 
aus persönlichem Umgange dargestelt (1862) several times during the late 
1860s.  Gwinner’s book focused on Schopenhauer’s life and character as well as 
his system of thought.  James’s repeated return to this book indicates an early 
interest in the relation between the philosopher’s character or temperament, on 
the one hand, and his way of thinking, on the other, an interest that was 
generalized in James’s “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879/1978c), which 
made pertinent references to Schopenhauer (1859) and led to James’s later 
distinction between the philosophical tendencies of “the tender-minded” and 
those of “the tough-minded” (James, 1907/1975a) and to his claim that “a 
philosophy is the expression of a man’s intimate character, and all definitions of 
the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon 
it” (James, 1909/1977, p. 14).  All three works reflect James’s underlying 
interest in the psychology of philosophers, or more precisely, “The Psychology 
of Philosophizing,” which he had tentatively considered as a title for “The 
Sentiment of Rationality” (James, ca. 1877/1978d, p. 359).  His views on this 
topic, underlying his defense of “the subjective method” (e.g., James, 
1878/1978b), were thus almost certainly influenced by his reflections on 
Schopenhauer – and more than that, they were probably influenced by 
Schopenhauer’s own reflections “On the Metaphysical Need of Man” 
(Schopenhauer, 1859, Vol. 2, Ch. 17), which James made a special note of 
having read in late 1869 (James, 1868-1873).  His annotated copy of 
Schopenhauer’s (1859) masterpiece confirms the care that he took in this 
reading. 
NEW INSIGHTS: PART I                                            13 
	  
William James Studies: Vol. 11 
	  
Schopenhauer also seems to have made a deep impression upon James 
through his discussion of moral principles.  This was first apparent in James’s 
initial article (1875/1987a) on the vivisection controversy of the mid-1870s, in 
which he expressed respect but also some reservation regarding an unbending 
application of the Buddhist principle neminem laede (“injure no one”).  This 
way of stating the principle, in Latin, clearly comes from Schopenhauer, who 
frequently invoked this formulation in his works (e.g., Schopenhauer, 
1841/2009, p. 140).  (The full principle, in Latin, is neminem laede, imo omnes, 
quantum potes, juva, i.e., “injure no one; instead, help everyone as much as you 
can.”)  The final proof that this is so comes from the fact that, when James 
(1879-1885/1988) cited this principle in his later lectures, he gave Schopenhauer 
credit for it (p. 175).   
In various ways this principle is deeply consonant with “the moral 
business” to which James had dedicated his life.  In fact, it seems eventually to 
blend for him, as it did from the start for Schopenhauer, into a far-reaching view 
of how we should understand and approach one another.  Toward the end of the 
century, James wrote “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (1899/1983), 
which he considered his most important essay since it reveals “the perception on 
which my whole individualistic philosophy is based” (James, 1899/2000, p. 
522).  In this essay, undercutting later criticisms (based on misunderstanding) of 
his individualism, he argued that his individualistic philosophy is founded upon 
the perception that each and every individual – not just “I” or a limited group of 
“we” – is to be treated with the same respect and accorded the same dignity 
because of the underlying humanity shared by all.  This essay, which has been 
called the first modern manifesto for multiculturalism (Sollors, 1996), is both 
pluralistic in its emphasis on variation and difference, and monistic in its 
emphasis upon equal rights and mutual dependency.  In defense of a theme that 
James expressed in various ways in multiple writings (e.g., that each of us 
contributes a different syllable to the common message of human experience), 
James argued that every person enjoys “a partial superiority of insight from the 
peculiar position in which he stands” (1899/1983, p. 149).  He spelled out the 
implications of this view in subsequent works (e.g., James, 1907/1975b & 
1909/1975c), and the same attitude suffused his notion that the community – 
ultimately the world-wide community – is the operative agent for the 
advancement of knowledge, ideals, values, and behavior. This is not an exact 
replication of Schopenhauer’s views, but it suggests that James eventually came 
to see the identification of individuals with each other, which caused him such 
anxiety in the early 1870s, in a more positive light.  By then, sympathy and 
compassion, Schopenhauer’s key moral virtues, had become fundamental to his 
own ethical and social thought.  
James also came to have a more positive view of Hindu thought and of Tat 
twam asi in particular, as seen in the mysticism chapter of The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, where he wrote: 
 
This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the 
individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement.  
In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we 
become aware of our oneness.  This is the everlasting and 
triumphant mystical tradition….‘That art thou!’ [Tat twam asi] 
say the Upanishads, and the Vedantists add: ‘Not a part, not a 
mode of That, but identically That, that absolute Spirit of the 
World.’ (James, 1902/1985, p. 332) 
 
That James now saw what had previously scared him as a positive thing, as 
the essential “mystical truth” (p. 333), is demonstrated by the entire context in 
which he wrote this passage.  Like “such self-contradictory phrases as ‘dazzling 
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obscurity,’” he now regarded talk about melding many into one as being closer 
to “music” than “conceptual speech” (p. 333).  Schopenhauer, the great advocate 
of music, would have understood and appreciated this statement, which 
underscores a point made above, about the artistic rather than literal significance 
of Schopenhauer’s thought.  Such music gives us a way of comprehending our 
common, shared humanity, warts and all.  And that comprehension led James to 
the implicit poly- or pantheism, mentioned earlier, that held humans responsible 
for assisting in the creation of a more ideal world (see James, 1882/1997a, p. 
195; 1902/1985, p. 413; & 1907/1975b, pp. 131-144).  In this way and others, 
Schopenhauer seems to have provided a stimulus that eventually sensitized 
James to the claims, rights, and significance of “the other.” 
Of course, Schopenhauer also provided ideas that James pushed against, 
which surely constituted as important – sometimes a greater – influence than 
ideas he agreed with.  For instance, in understanding and then opposing both 
naïve optimism and rebarbative pessimism, the latter being represented by 
Schopenhauer, James came to his own middle position of meliorism, which 
treats “salvation” as neither inevitable (as optimism does) nor impossible (as 
pessimism does) but as possible; and from early on, possibility was a word that 
opened up for James a vibrant, challenging, and ultimately invigorating world of 
risk and opportunity (see James, 1875/1987b, p. 313, & 1907/1975b).  In a 
closely related matter, Schopenhauer served as an unacknowledged but apparent 
interlocutor regarding a question that Schopenhauer was famous for prompting 
many others to consider, namely, Is life worth living?  (On Schopenhauer’s role 
in “the pessimism controversy” of the late nineteenth century, see Beiser, 2014, 
Ch. 5.)  James addressed this issue squarely in an 1895 address to members of 
Harvard’s YMCA, which was later included in The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy (James, 1895/1897b).  In this address he spoke of 
pessimism as “essentially a religious disease” (p. 40) and underscored its 
“nightmare view of life” (p. 41), specifically relating it to “that metaphysical 
tedium vitae which is peculiar to reflecting men” (39) and to the “suicidal 
mood” (p. 52) associated with it.  In the end, he exhorted his young listeners to 
“Be not afraid of life.  Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help 
create the fact” (p. 56).  This advice foreshadowed not only his subsequent 
address on “The Will to Believe” (James, 1896/1897a) but also the conclusion 
of The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985), in which he asserted his 
own strong preference for a life in which the “keynote” is “hope” rather than 
“resignation” (p. 414).  (As in his earlier addresses, he made it clear that the 
prevalence of “hope” over “resignation” does not depend upon any 
demonstrable truth about the ultimate character of the universe, since such truth 
lies outside our human ken; rather, it depends upon one’s temperamental 
inclination as well as one’s will to believe.)  Though James did not refer to him 
in this context, Schopenhauer’s presence is clearly signaled in James’s use of 
“resignation,” which was widely known to be Schopenhauer’s recommendation 
regarding the appropriate attitude to show in the face of reality.  
(Schopenhauer’s recommendation was accepted explicitly by many, including 
Sigmund Freud.)  For James, uncertainty about the ultimate nature of the 
universe and the efficacy of individual effort was sufficient to allow him to 
respond to what “feels like a real fight” and real “possibilities” (James, 
1895/1897b, p. 55) by asserting his willingness to live on the “chance” that 
fighting back, resisting the pressures of the world, and being strenuous in 
standing up for one’s own preferences could make a difference in the world 
(James, 1902/1985, p. 414).  
Much more could be said – for example, about Schopenhauer as the 
inspiration of James’s understanding of the problem of being, as a stimulant of 
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his treatment of perception, as a possible source of his beloved concept of the 
“sting” of certain precious moments of experience, as an interlocutor regarding 
immortality, and so forth.  But it is time to end.  In doing so, I want to be clear:  
More research is needed before it can be said, without qualification, that 
Schopenhauer was a major influence on James, but on the basis of what has 
been disclosed in this article and noted in this appendix, it seems reasonable to 
conjecture that Schopenhauer was in fact among the more significant figures in 
James’s life and work.  At minimum, even without further study, it can be said 
that Schopenhauer was instrumental at an important moment in James’s life and 
that he remained on the edges of James’s consciousness, prodding and 
provoking, throughout his career.   
It will be interesting to see how the connection between Schopenhauer and 
James will come to be understood if and as other scholars subject it to closer 
inspection.  
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NOTES 
 
1This passage, which appears on pp. 134-135, is attributed in the text to a 
French correspondent, whose communication James has allegedly translated 
“freely” into English.  It is now universally accepted, given James’s own 
admission to the translator of Varieties into French (!), that the communication 
was in fact a report of his own case – of his “acute neurasthenic attack with 
phobia,” as he called it – whose “provenance,” he said, he had “naturally 
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disguised” (from a letter reproduced in an appendix to James, 1902/1985, p. 
508).   
2I am personally satisfied with “generally truthful” as a description of 
James’s account of his personal crisis.  Still, I am going to argue that James’s 
account is likely to have been less “a composite composition” than Croce (2009, 
p. 57) had reason to suggest, without knowledge of the discoveries I will 
discuss.  And I can see no reason or evidence that bars me from imagining, at 
least, that James, fluent enough in French, may actually have written an initial 
account of his crisis in French, and that he might have translated that account 
later into English, as he claimed to have done in Varieties (James, 1902/1985, p. 
134).  If a written account, either in French or English, still existed when James 
died, it could have been destroyed by his widow or eldest son, Henry James III, 
who burned many personal letters and papers in the years after his death.  Of 
course, if James had written an account at the time of the incident, he would 
almost certainly have done so in his private diary – the same diary from which 
entries between April 30, 1870, and February 10, 1873, have been removed 
(James, 1868-1873).  In fact, given everything else that he was writing down in 
this diary between 1868 and 1873, including comments on his suicidal 
inclinations, it would be surprising if he hadn’t written a report in his diary.  
And if he did so, mightn’t he have done so in French, perhaps to disguise its 
“provenance” in case someone – a parent? – happened to open his diary?  
Though not typical, there was a precedent for his writing a personal entry in 
French, surrounded by quotation marks, as if he had copied it from some French 
clinical source:  On July 22, 1868, he wrote what Richardson has called “a 
conversation with himself” in French, which began (as translated) “So – you 
want to die?” (James, 1868-1873, discussed by Richardson, 2006, p. 93).  
Clearly, both instances (this passage and a possible later report of his 
hallucinatory experience) involved deeply troubling personal incidents in 
James’s life.  If James did write a diary account of his frightful experience, one 
could wonder if it was James himself who later tore it out…and whether he did 
so to share it with Alice Howe Gibbens, when he determined that she should 
know everything about him before deciding upon his fitness as a potential 
husband, as illustrated by his sharing of two entries written in his “memorandum 
pad” during what he identified to her as his “pessimistic crisis” in the earlier 
1870s (James, 1877/1995g, p. 572).  Or, less dramatically, he could have ripped 
it out in order to use it in writing Varieties.  These are all things that I can 
imagine, as I say.  While I cannot and will not argue for any of these 
possibilities, they are nonetheless consistent with what is known at the present 
time.   
3Menand (2001) suggests that “there was no philosopher (Schopenhauer 
was a possible exception) for whom James felt a deeper loathing than Hegel” (p. 
358), and Richardson (2006) notes that James “came to loathe Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism” (p. 14).  It’s easy to see how they came to these conclusions, but I 
would suggest that the loathing had more to do with attitude than substance 
(granting that attitude overlapped with substance for James), and that it obscures 
an underlying respect.  The ultimate source of Menand’s comment may be the 
passage in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985) in which James 
belittled Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, despite their sometimes “ennobling 
sadness,” for their othertimes “peevishness” that comes across like “the sick 
shriekings of two dying rats” (p. 39).  Richardson’s conclusion is related to a 
negative comment made when James refused to serve on a committee working 
toward the construction of a statue in honor of Schopenhauer – a comment from 
the same letter that Perry quoted at length.  But James’s deep respect for 
Schopenhauer is also apparent in this letter, though underplayed in his typically 
playful manner.  Noting that “I really must decline to stir a finger for the glory 
of one who studiously lived for no other purpose than to spit upon the lives of 
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the like of me” (a statement that is directly relevant to the analysis that follows 
in this article), James wrote that “if there be any kernel of truth in 
Schopenhauer’s system, (and it seems to me there is a deep one) it ought to be 
celebrated in silence and in secret, by the inner lives of those to whom it speaks” 
since “taking some things seriously is incompatible with ‘celebrating’ them” 
(James, 1883/1997b, p. 456).  Despite this hint of a more positive view of 
Schopenhauer, no biographer or scholar has attended to James’s relationship 
with this important philosopher.  Not even Feinstein (1984), who focused so 
closely on the details of James’s early development (extending into the 1870s), 
picked up on the hints elaborated upon in this article. 
4I am focusing in this paragraph, as was Perry, on the period between 1858 
and 1877.  There is a good amount of evidence about later contact between 
James’s thought and Schopenhauer’s, some of which will be reviewed in the 
appendix to this article.  And, of course, there is more evidence now about 
James’s contact with Schopenhauer before 1875, as I will discuss in what 
follows. 
5There are now good English translations of the works that I have 
mentioned: Schopenhauer (1841/2009, 1851/1974, 1859/1966, & 1864/2012).  
James purchased and signed his own copy of Schopenhauer’s two-volume Die 
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (3d ed., 1859) in Paris in early November 1868.  
Both volumes, annotated by James, are in Houghton Library at Harvard 
University.  Although he read an earlier (1841) edition of Die beiden 
Grundprobleme der Ethik in 1870, at some subsequent date (1881 or later) he 
purchased and annotated an (1881) edition that was sold in 1923, according to a 
list of “William James’s Sources” composed by Ralph Barton Perry and 
deposited in Harvard’s Houghton Library, catalogued as MS Am 1092.9 (4578).  
There is also good reason to suppose that James discussed Schopenhauer’s ideas 
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the late 1860s.  See Holmes (1923/1964, p. 
215) for confirmation of his familiarity with Schopenhauer, which almost 
certainly stemmed from this period (see Howe, 1957, p. 260).  And he probably 
saw and read various articles on Schopenhauer, including three English 
translations that appeared in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
(Schopenhauer, 1867a, 1867b, & 1871).  His primary reading of Schopenhauer’s 
works, however, was in the original German.   
6It is relevant to note that James’s dual (physical and moral) collapse 
occurred, by his own reckoning, around the time that, in fact, he checked a book 
by Schopenhauer out of the Harvard College Library, though the argument in 
this article doesn’t depend upon this possible conjunction, largely because of 
James’s propensity for backsliding – for making some progress and then falling 
back into physical and mental doldrums.  The forward-and-backward, 
sometimes zigzagging nature of James’s development during this period is 
illustrated by James’s on-and-off acceptance of the conscious automaton theory, 
as I’ve discussed elsewhere (Leary, 2013) at considerable length.  It is also 
illustrated by the various times at which he seems to have accepted Charles 
Renouvier’s argument for free will, only to lapse in that acceptance and have to 
accept it all over again.  (This point is related to but not exactly the same as the 
point made in Note #9.)  The issues surrounding James’s vacillating views on 
the conscious automaton theory and free will go hand-in-hand with his broader 
wresting with “the moral business,” as discussed below. 
7I won’t rehearse all of the issues associated with James’s crisis since 
Croce (2009) has already discussed most of them.  I do want to note, however, 
that among the possible issues (according to Sander L. Gilman, Kim Townsend, 
and Donald Capps) are guilt and fear prompted by James’s reading of the 
medical literature on “sexual abuse” and “insane masturbators” (see Croce, 
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2009, pp. 43, 44, & 49).  I agree with Croce’s conclusion that “there is very little 
evidence to support this reading of the crisis” (p. 45).  In addition, Capps’ 
association of “auto-eroticism” with James’s mention of his “moral degradation” 
(touched upon by Croce, 2009, p. 49) seems to me to misconstrue the 
significance that “the moral business” had for James, as seen throughout his 
earlier and later letters as well as many entries in his diary.   
8Even at the age of 16, James felt that “everyone’s object in life” should be 
“to be as much use as possible” and that “the best way to serve God is to serve 
your fellow men.”  After all, he asked, “which of us would wish to go through 
life without leaving a trace behind to mark his passage”?  This foreshadowed his 
later concern about “the moral business” in which “every man can do as much as 
is in his power and having done so will have fulfilled his mission.  We must all 
lead an active life and live for others, not for ourselves….We must try to bring 
about that happy time when everyone will have enough for him self [sic] 
materially, and will work for the common good” (James, 1858/1995a, pp. 11-
13).  Ten years later, despite many vicissitudes in other regards, he still held the 
same opinion:  “The thought that with me outlasts all others…is the thought of 
my having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood of men….And if we 
have to give up all hope of seeing into the purposes of God…we can by our will 
make the enjoyment of our brothers stand us in the stead of a final cause 
and…lead a life so active, and so sustained by a clean-conscience as not to need 
to fret much….Contribute your mite in any way to the mass of work wh. each 
generation subtracts fm. the task of the next, and you will come in to real 
relations with your brothers….Every thing [sic] we know & are is through men.  
We have no revelation but through man” (James, 1868/1995b, pp. 248-250).  
For all his wavering about whether or not he had a free will and thereby could 
fulfill his deepest hope, James never wavered regarding the nature of “the moral 
business” that would make his life meaningful.  Even when he was “swamped in 
an empirical philosophy” that made him “feel that we are Nature through and 
through, that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens 
save as the result of physical laws,” he held out hope that “we are [also, 
somehow] en rapport with reason.”  But “how to conceive it? who knows?” 
(James, 1869/1995c, pp. 370-371).  Richardson (2006) nicely summarizes what 
James meant by “the moral business,” namely, “that, after all, we are able to will 
and to choose our path in life, that we are not powerless pawns in an all-
determined universe.  It is not what fate does to us that matters; what matters is 
what we do with what fate does to us” (p. 111).  To James, the great question 
was whether or not we do, indeed, live in “a moral universe” in which our 
efforts make a difference.  Later in life he related his conviction that we do live 
in such a universe to a virtual poly- or even pantheism that held humans 
responsible for assisting in the creation of a more ideal world.  (See the 
appendix to this article.) 
9This is illustrated best, perhaps, by the fact that James had to return to 
Renouvier’s text for periodic booster shots.  After one of these shots – two and a 
half years after he reported the positive effect of Renouvier’s essay in late April 
1870 – he wrote to Renouvier himself to inform him that he was just then 
“beginning to experience a rebirth of the moral life” due to the influence of his 
philosophy (James, 1872/1995e, p. 430; trans. in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, p. 662).  
And this incipient rebirth took place a full five months before his father reported 
that James was just then showing a vast improvement based partly on his 
reading of Renouvier (quoted in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 339-340), an 
improvement that will be mentioned later in this article.  Clearly, recovery from 
depression, anxiety, physical exhaustion, and other problems is always likely to 
be a slow and uneven process.  I mention all of this simply to caution against 
any simplistic view that James was converted and transformed once and for all 
by his reading of Renouvier’s text in April 1870. 
DAVID E. LEARY                                            24  
	  
 
William James Studies: Vol. 11 
	  
10A rapid rise in Western knowledge about Eastern thought, fueled by 
scholarship as well as translations of ancient texts, was a widespread 
phenomenon throughout the nineteenth century.  Although Schopenhauer 
reached the basic conclusions of his philosophy in the early decades of the 
century before he encountered Hinduism and Buddhism, he soon realized that 
their affinity with his own ideas, coupled with their ancient origins and 
multitude of adherents, made them a boon to his own purposes.  He not only 
became an advocate of Eastern wisdom but also adopted its moral principles (in 
particular, its fundamental principle of sympathy and compassion for all living 
creatures).  On these topics, see Cartwright (2010), Droit (2003), and Magee 
(1997b).  Here are some representative statements by Schopenhauer, which 
James would have read prior to his personal crisis and which are relevant to 
points I will be making.  First, from Parerga and Paralipomena (1851/1974; 
loosely translated as “Additions and Omissions”), which James, like most 
readers outside the German-speaking world, encountered first among 
Schopenhauer’s publications (in its German version, of course, not in its later 
English translation):  “The readers of my Ethics know that with me the 
foundation of morality rests ultimately on the truth that has its expression in the 
Veda and Vedanta in the established mystical formula tat tvam asi (This art 
thou) which is stated with reference to every living thing, whether man or 
animal, and is then called the Mahavakya or Great Word” (Vol. 2, p. 219).  Note 
that this English translation, like all English renderings of this saying (other than 
James’s!), transliterates the German w (in twam) into the English v (in tvam) to 
preserve the same sound.  This will be relevant to my argument.  “With the 
Hindus and Buddhists…the Mahavakya (the great word) ‘tat tvam asi’ (this art 
thou) applies and is always to be expressed over every animal in order that we 
may have before us, as a guide to our conduct, the identity of his inner nature 
and ours” (p. 373).  And now from a later English translation of the third edition 
of The World as Will and Representation (1859/1966), the edition that James 
purchased and read in German:  “Plurality in general is necessarily conditioned 
by time and space, and only in these is conceivable, and in this respect we call 
them the principium individuationis….This thing-in-itself [the underlying nature 
of all, namely, the will, according to Schopenhauer]…lies outside time and 
space, and accordingly knows no plurality, and consequently is one” (Vol. 1, pp. 
127-128).  “If we had to convey to the beholder, for reflection and in a word, the 
explanation and information about their inner nature, it would be best for us to 
use the Sanskrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of the 
Hindus, and is called Mahavakya, i.e., the great word: ‘Tat tvam asi,’ which 
means “This living thing are thou’” (p. 220).  “Historical philosophy,” 
concerned with things in time, “stops at what Kant calls the phenomenon in 
opposition to the thing-in-itself, and what Plato calls the becoming…in 
opposition to the being…, or finally what is called by the Indians the web of 
Maya” (p. 274).  “Birth and death belong only to the phenomenon of the will, 
and hence to life….Birth and death belong equally to life….The wisest of all 
mythologies, the Indian, expresses this by giving to the very god who 
symbolizes destruction and death…the lingam, that symbol of generation….In 
this way, it is intimated that generation and death…reciprocally neutralize and 
eliminate each other” (pp. 275-276).  “The individual is only the phenomenon, 
not the thing-in-itself….As soon as we enter into ourselves…and wish for once 
to know ourselves fully by directing our knowledge inwards, we lose ourselves 
in the bottomless void; we find ourselves like a hollow glass globe, from the 
emptiness of which a voice speaks” (p. 278).  “The life of every individual, 
viewed as a whole and in general,…is really a tragedy” (p. 322).  “The Maya of 
the Indians, the work and fabric of which are the whole world of illusions, is 
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paraphrased by amor” in that love-making produces what seem to be 
ontologically distinct individuals (p. 330).  “The eyes of the uncultured 
individual are clouded, as the Indians say, by the veil of Maya….He sees not the 
inner nature of things, which is one, but its phenomena as separated, detached, 
innumerable, very different, and indeed opposed” (p. 352).  “We find the direct 
presentation in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and 
wisdom, the kernel of which has finally come to us in the Upanishads as the 
greatest gift to the nineteenth century.  It is expressed in various ways, but 
especially by the fact that all beings of the world, living and lifeless,” have 
“pronounced” over them, “tat tvam asi, which means ‘This art thou’” (p. 355).  
“The veil of Maya envelops the mind” so that an individual “regards his person 
as absolutely different from every other” and “adheres with all his might” to this 
illusion “since it alone suits and supports his egoism” (p. 365).  “Whoever is still 
involved in the principium individuationis, in egoism, knows only particular 
things and their relation to his person” (p. 378).  These quotations, all taken 
from the first volume of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation (the 
first edition of which appeared in 1818, though dated 1819), should suffice as 
background evidence supporting the claims I will make.  The second volume, 
first published in 1844, is composed of supplementary elaborations and 
commentaries on the sections of the first edition. 
11In directly addressing Minny in his diary, James was doing something 
that was unprecedented in earlier entries and unparalleled in later ones.  But 
then, in addressing her in his Schopenhauerian frame of mind, he was actually 
addressing himself as – consistent with the argument in this article – he had 
dropped the veil that separated him and her and had come to realize his 
fundamental identification with her.  He graphically represented this moment in 
his life by drawing a tombstone in his diary with the inscription “March 9 / M+T 
/ 1870.”  Note that Minny Temple died on March 8.  March 9 was the date on 
which James learned about Minny’s death, and died along with her.   
12This is a good place to address a very reasonable question that might be 
in the reader’s mind.  Weren’t the transcendentalists – and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, in particular – interested in Eastern thought?  Didn’t they advance 
translations of the sacred documents of the East, and didn’t Emerson himself 
publish essays on “Spiritual Laws” (1841/1903a), “The Over-Soul” 
(1841/1903b), and “Illusions” (1860/1903c) as well as a poem on “Brahma” 
(1867/1903d) that convey fundamental insights of Eastern thought?  Couldn’t 
these writings, with which James was familiar, have been the source of his 
thinking during his period of crisis?  That’s a sensible conjecture, but in fact the 
first two essays, appearances aside, were drawn primarily from Emerson’s 
immersion in Neoplatonic thought, and none of Emerson’s writings includes a 
reference to the Sanskrit Tat twam (or tvam) asi.  Meanwhile, the strongest 
evidence that James’s use of Tat twam asi and its related cluster of ideas came 
from Schopenhauer rather than Emerson (or any other transcendentalist) is that 
single letter – the ‘w’ in twam – in James’s spelling of that word each time he 
cites it.  This indicates that James was quoting a German source (see Note #10), 
and hence Schopenhauer, since no other German source with which he was 
familiar included the same cluster of terms and ideas.  James’s interest in 
Buddhism was clearly piqued, however, and in the latter half of 1870 he read 
parts, at least, of Alabaster’s The Modern Buddhist (1870), the first volume of 
Köppen’s Religion des Buddha (1857), and Taine’s “Le Boudhissme” (1865), 
followed by Bastian’s Die Weltauffassung der Buddhisten (1870) in early 1871.  
He also read Sen’s Brahmo Somaj (1870) in late 1870, though this work treated 
a newly Christianized form of Hinduism.  (All these texts are listed in James, 
1868-1873; Köppen’s was checked out of Harvard College Library on 
September 13, 1870.)  Interestingly, James didn’t mention any of this reading in 
his extant letters and manuscript notes.  More significantly, he had  cited Tat 
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twam asi in his diary on March 22, 1870, well before reading these other books, 
which eliminates them as potential sources of his knowledge of that Sanskrit 
phrase.  Finally, his reading of Taine’s article, with its more positive spin on 
“the cult of nothingness,” might have started James thinking in a less negative 
light about Hindu and Buddhist views.  See Droit (2003, especially pp. 133-
148), which includes a discussion of Nietzsche’s contemporaneous reaction to 
Buddhism.  Droit begins his book discussing the widespread Western reaction 
against Buddhism in the middle of the nineteenth century, a reaction that 
depicted Buddhism as “a paradoxical and horrible religion of nothingness,” thus 
reinforcing the then-common belief that Eastern thought is inherently negative 
or pessimistic (pp. 4-5).  He doesn’t mention James but James’s initial reaction 
fits within the pattern he describes.  Droit’s book is devoted to “an analysis of 
this error” (p. 5). 
13It is relevant to note that, so far as letters, diary entries, and library 
records indicate, James followed through on his intention not to read 
Schopenhauer’s books for some time, thus confirming (to the extent that a 
negative can imply a positive) that it was Schopenhauer to whom he was 
referring. 
14It might seem strange that James was relieved to think that mental 
disorder didn’t require a physical basis – that it could also be due to 
circumstantial and psychological causes – but the flip side was that one could do 
something, potentially, about circumstances and psychological phenomena (like 
misperceptions and phobias) whereas James’s great fear was that physical 
causes could not be thwarted in the same way.  In fact, before the conversion 
reported to his father, he had worried that the James family had some congenital 
weakness (“s’thing in the blood”) that predisposed them to mental and physical 
troubles, which had led him to swear off marriage for himself and to counsel his 
brother Robertson to avoid marriage as well (James, 1869/1995d).  Note that 
James’s personal crisis revolved around the fear that if nature so decided – if 
physical processes just happened to work out that way – he would be reduced to 
the same imbecilic state as the poor epileptic patient he had seen in an asylum.  
As regards Schopenhauer’s views, although he admitted that mental disorder 
could result from “external, objective occasions” such as unrequited love and the 
strains of war, he argued that “madness…depends more often on purely somatic 
causes” (Schopenhauer, 1859/1966, Vol. 2, p. 401).  As for Wordsworth, the 
chief work that James had been reading was Wordsworth’s long narrative poem 
“The Excursion” (1814/1977), which argues, in essence, that nature is the 
product of both mind and matter – that the mind is not a passive recipient of 
matter’s causal pressures, but rather, that it actively confers order, meaning, and 
value to matter.  This was a message that James needed.  Especially the poem’s 
fourth book on “Despondency Corrected” provided “authentic tidings” of “the 
mind’s excursive power” (pp. 154-155; James, 1874/1995f, p. 488).  
Wordsworth himself foresaw the effect of his poem: “To enfeebled Power, / 
From this communion with uninjured Minds, / What renovation had been 
brought; and what / Degree of healing to a wounded spirit” (p. 289). 
15It is worth noting that this dating accords with the best estimate of 
James’s son, Henry James III, which was accepted by John E. Smith in his 
introduction to the definitive edition of James’s Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902/1985, p. xvii).  
16 On January 1, 1870, the first two sets of “works” that James resolved (in 
his diary) to finish reading that year were his father’s and Schopenhauer’s 
(James, 1868-1873).  According to a list in that same diary, he had already read 
his father’s Moralism and Christianity (1850) in the months after receiving his 
M.D. on June 21, 1869 – in fact, right after he had read Schopenhauer’s chapter 
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on “man’s need for metaphysics” (see this article’s appendix on Schopenhauer 
and James).  Later that year he had read his father’s Lectures and Miscellanies 
(1852).  Then, the first book he listed in his diary as read in 1870 was his 
father’s Nature of Evil (1855).  Subsequently in 1870, he read two more of his 
father’s works.  His father was, of course, a more than subtle presence in 
nurturing James’s sensitivity to evil and an indirect influence with regard to 
Schopenhauer, by making the collection of the Boston Athenaeum available to 
him.  In addition, his father’s own personal crisis (his famous “vastation” 
experience of 1844) became entangled with James’s recollections of his own 
crisis to the extent that he drew attention to it (in a footnote) when he reported 
on his own moment of crisis in The Varieties of Religious Experience 
1902/1985, p. 135).  As for Marcus Aurelius, whom James had read earlier and 
to whom he returned from time to time, Harvard’s Houghton Library has the 
annotated copy of The Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus (1864), 
inscribed by “Wm. James / Boston Feby 1865.”  For information on James’s 
relation to Aurelius, see Sutton (2009).  As regards James’s concern about 
scientific determinism, see Leary (2013). 
17Just as I was completing this article, I received from John Kaag a 
photocopy of the title page of the first volume of Julius Frauenstädt’s 
Schopenhauer-Lexikon: Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch (1871).  This 
dictionary of Schopenhauer’s philosophical terms has no annotations in it but 
the title page bears the following inscription: “W. E. Hocking / from the library 
of William James / May 1923.”  This previously unknown possession of James 
doesn’t appear in R. B. Perry’s list of volumes sold from James’s library in 1923 
after his widow Alice died in 1922 (regarding this list, see Note #5), presumably 
because Perry included only volumes that were annotated by James, though it is 
also possible that the volume was given rather than sold to Hocking, who taught 
at Harvard in the decades following James’s death in 1910.  The discovery of 
this volume, which underscores James’s interest in Schopenhauer’s work, serves 
as yet another reminder of the ephemeral nature of historical evidence and the 
resulting gaps in the historical record (a reminder, that is, of something already 
illustrated by the discoveries related in this article and its sequel).  When James 
purchased this volume and how he may have used it cannot now be determined; 
but the existence of another bit of Jamesian Schopenhaueriana belies any claims 
about his lack of interest in Schopenhauer’s thought.  John Kaag found this 
volume when he recently stumbled upon the previously unknown library of 
(William) Ernest Hocking at the Hocking family’s New Hampshire estate (see 
Kaag, 2014).  It is relevant to add that among the other books once owned by 
James, also found by Kaag in Hocking’s library, were Henry Clarke Warren’s 
Buddhism in Translation (1896) and Paul Carus’s Buddhism and Its Christian 
Critics (1897).  (Warren’s book is included on Perry’s list, mentioned above and 
in Note #5; Carus’s is not, though his 1898 Gospel of Buddha is listed there.)  
James did annotate these books, and his annotations have allowed Kaag (2012) 
to clarify the significance of Buddhism for some of James’s important analyses 
and assertions in Varieties and other late-life works.  Additional sources that 
offer similar clarification (including the results of archival research by David 
Scott and Eugene Taylor) are discussed by King (2005). 
 
 
 
